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COMMENT
SALES - WARRANTIES - THE NECESSITY OF PRIVITY OF
CONTRACT IN SUITS BASED ON WARRANTIES
NE MANIFEST deficiency found in the Uniform Sales Act
has been the operation of the sections which provide for
warranties, express or implied, in the sale of goods., These
sections set out the situations in which warranties arise in the
sale of merchandise but refer only to "buyer" and "seller," by
implication excluding those who do not fall in those categories.
It is a well-settled majority rule that consumers who purchase
from a middleman cannot recover from the original manu-
facturer of a defective 'chattel, but must proceed instead
against the seller because they are not in privity of contract
with the manufacturer. 2 And a fortiori the courts have denied
reliefi on the basis of a warranty action in cases where, for
one reason or another, the person injured by a defective
chattel was not legally a buyer.
3
I "Definition of Express Warranty. Any affirmation of fact or any promise by
the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency
of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and
if the buyer purchased the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of
the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion
only shall be construed as a warranty." Uniform Sales Act 112, N.D. Rev. Code
§51-0113 (1943).
"Implied Warranties of Quality. Subject to the provisions of this chapter
and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as
to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a
contract to sell or a sale except as follows:
"1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, whether he is the grower or manu-
facturer or not, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably
fit for that purpose;
"2. Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description, whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchanteable quality;
"3. If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as
regards the defects which such examination ought to have revealed;
"4. In the case of contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any
particular purpose;
"5. On implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for a parti-
cular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade; and
"6. An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or con-
dition implied under this chapter unless inconsistent therewith." Uniform Sales
Act §15, N.D. Rev. Code §51-0116 (1943). For the distinction between a sale and
a contract to sell, referred to in the provision above, see 1 Williston, Sales §9
(2d ed. 1924).
2 Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, '234 N.W. 517 (1931);
Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 906 (1927); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers
Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 Va. L. Rev. 134,
148 (1937).
3 Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), was a case where a customer
in a self service grocery store was injured when a bottle of gingerale which
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As one commentator has stated, ". . . a study of the liability
of the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser presents the
evolution of one phase of the law of sales in dramatic form.
In less than a century the rapid changes in merchandising
methods have demanded a shift from the policy of protecting
the manufacturer to that of protecting the consumer as against
the manufacturer." 4 Inherent in any such shift, it is apparent,
are basic considerations of social policy shaped by the trans-
formation of the business world from a relatively direct manu-
facturer-purchaser relationship to a vastly more complicated
system of sub-vendees - wholesalers, warehousemen, retailers
and the like - who stand between the consumer and the manu-
facturer. By holding a manufacturer liable for defects in the
goods he sends into the stream of commerce, even in the ab-
sence of a showing of negligence, he is in effect being made
an insurer of the goods.5 This is concededly a drastic result,
and there is good reason for hesitating to impose such an
absolute liability on manufacturers as would result from a
rule permitting suits on warranties even in the absence of
privity of contract.6 Nevertheless, the enforcement of this
type of liability appears both desirable and just, especially
in the case of articles intended for human use, because it
places responsibility upon the agency in the best position to
prevent the production of defective and unwholesome mer-
chandise, the manufacturer.
7
she was placing in a merchandise cart to take to the cashier exploded. The
,customer sued the bottler for breach of an implied warranty of fitness concern-
ing the bottle. It was held that the suit was improperly brought, since the
customer had no contractual relation with the store until payment of the price
for the bottle and therefore she could not claim damages for the breach of
warranty, since the warranty did not extend to her in the absence of some con-
tractual relationship. Accord, Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224,
65 N.E.2d 305 (1946), 47 Col. L. Rev. 156, 41 I1. L. Rev. 676 (1947). But com-
pare Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 222 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1949) (similar facts in
negligence action with apparent strict liability rule imposed on bottler).
4 Jeanblan.', supra note 2, at 134.
5 See Note, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 107, 114 (1949).
6 "If it is desirable to insure every customer against such a risk, is it fair to
make manufacturer, or those who by chance are his customers, bear its burden ?
If it is desirable, it seems a more straightforward result might be reached by
proposing it as a government insurance, thus giving everyone concerned, in
theory, a part in administering the policy, rather than permitting those adminis-
tering the question of civil liabilities to effect a collateral result by burdening
those who chance to be within their jurisdiction. On the single ground of
desirability of insuring consumers against injury, without anything more, it
does not seem that the absolute liability result can be pronounced fair to the
parties." Peairs, The God in the Machine, A Study in Precedent, 29 B.U.L. Rev.
35, 77 (1949).
7 Jeanblanc, supra note 2, at 157.
COMMENT
It has been said that the classic case, ". . . with which any
discussion of this topic must begin," 8 is the decision of Winter-
bottom v. Wright.o This was an action on the case for injuries
sustained by a driver of a mail coach who was injured when
the coach broke down because of latent defects. The defendant
had a contract with the plaintiff's employer to keep the coach
in repair. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover be-
cause the defendant's duty under the contract ran to the
plaintiff's employer alone, and the plaintiff was not a privy
to the contract. The language used in this decision came, in
time, to be quoted for the rule that where one was injured by
a defective chattel due to the negligence of the manufacturer
supplying it, he could not recover against the manufacturer
because he was not in privity of contract with the manu-
facturer.10 The harshness of such a rule appears self evident,
but later decisions quickly established a series of exceptions.
Thus, lack of privity of contract was held no barrier to
recovery by some courts where the contract was a unilateral
one between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.
11
It has been held that the implied warranty which a manu-
facturer extends to a retailer is also available to the sub-
purchaser of the goods on the principle sustaining third party
beneficiary contracts. 12 The Washington Supreme Court has
held that an implied warranty of fitness of the chattel runs to
the sub-purchaser as if the warranty were a covenant running
with the land.18 Sales of unwholesome food and beverages were
held exceptions to the rule that there can be no recovery
without privity of contract.'4 One writer comments that the
North Carolina court has talked as if there were a separate
law of Coca-Cola.15 Other writers have argued that manu-
8 Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
2 (1925).
0 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Repr. 402 (1842).
10 Feezer, supra note 8, at 3; Jeanblanc, supra note 2, at 134.
"Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1 Q.B. 256, 62 L.J.Q.B. 257;
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932).
12 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). This
holding appears to be accepted by the tentative draft of the Uniform Commercial
Code 12-318 (May, 1949), discussed infra.
13 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
14 Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N.E. 625 (1922); Broom
v. Monroe Coca Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55, 156 S.E. 152 (1930); 9 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 360, 362 (1932). Cf. Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 131 N.E.
456 (1921); Wilson v. Ferguson Co., 214 Mass. 265, 101 N.E. 381 (1913).
15 See Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 868, 873 n. 29 (1933). This may well be true. The
case referred to is Broom v. Monroe Coca Cola Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55, 156 S.E.
152 (1930).
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facturers' advertisements are offers to create a contractual
relationship'1 or have pointed out that the action for breach
of warranty historically sounded in tort and could be brought
without the hampering requirement of privity.
17
It seems clear that the development of these multiple ex-
ceptions to the rule has had little effect except to emphasize
the need for a redefinition of the manufacturer's duty to the
consumer. "Under modern conditions, when products of foodc
or drink have been prepared under the exclusive supervision
of the manufacturer and the consumer must take them as they
are supplied, the representations constitute an implied con-
tract or implied warranty to the unknown and helpless con-
sumer that the article is good and wholesome and fit for use.
If privity of contract is required, then, under the situation
and circumstances of modern merchandise in such matters,
privity of contract exists in the consciousness and understand-
ing of all right thinking persons," the Missouri court has de-
clared., A comparable position has been taken by the federal
courts, which have stated that ". . . the remedies of the
injured consumers ought not to be made to depend on the in-
tricacies of the law of sales." i9 Oddly enough, it was to a prob-
lem of this type that Franklin Delano Roosevelt once referred
in citing the need for a less complicated law. "It would seem
to me," he said, "that there is to be little of the sacrosanct in
the problem of determining whether John Doe did actually
sell a defective bill of goods to Richard Roe. The core of the
matter, after all, is earthly fact, and no manner of theorizing
and of the invocation of precedent is going to solve the es-
sential issue." 20 However, attention should be called to the
fact that Mr. Roosevelt was not attempting to deal with the
main issue. It is not the problem of finding out whether Doe
sold defective goods to Roe - really a matter of evidence -
that has bothered the courts. It has been the question of decid-
18 Handler, False and Deceptive Advertising, 39 Yale L.J. 22, 26 (1929). But
see, taking a contrary view, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 354 (1932).
17 23 Calif. L. Rev. 621 (1935). For discussions of the early actions of breach
of warranty which sounded in tort, see Ames, A History of Assumpeit, 2 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888); 1 Williston, Sales §195 (2d ed. 1924); 18 Corn. L.Q. 445,
446 (1933).
18 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 90 S.W.2d 445, 450
(Kansas City Ct. of App. 1936).
19 Ketterer v. Armour, 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
20 1 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 271 (1938).
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ing whether Doe is liable for it that has caused most of the
confusion.21
Despite the steady growth of exceptions to the rule requiring
privity of contract, the rule itself has continued to cover most
of the situations coming before the courts. The normal situa-
tion is illustrated by the North Dakota case of Wood v. Ad-
vance Rumely Thresher Co. 22 In that case, the action was for
breach of an implied warranty concerning a tractor which the
plaintiff had purchased from a salesman employed by the de-
fendant. However, the tractor was not delivered directly from
the manufacturer but came from .a retail dealer, a fact the
court regarded as controlling. The result is stated concisely in
the opinion: "There being no privity of contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant in the instant case, there could be
no warranty and there being no warranty, it follows, that
there could not be a breach of warranty .... ,, 23 This result,
logical if the premise is accepted that privity of contract is an
indispensable element in a suit for breach of warranty, has
been reached even more decisively in the type of case where
the person injured by a defect in a chattel did not stand in the
position of purchaser of the chattel. Thus, it has been held that
survivors of a consumer who dies because of a defect in the
article purchased by the consumer cannot base their action on
breach of an implied warranty since there was no privity of
contract between the survivors and the retailer who sold the
article. 24 Where the contract is one which the law will not
recognize, such as an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, the
New York courts have held no recovery can be had for in-
juries caused by poisonous characteristics found in the drink
on the theory of implied warranty, since to allow recovery for
breach of warranty in this situation would mean recognizing
21 Actual business practices of manufacturers and retailers vary widely so
far as warranties are concerned. This is illustrated by a field survey made by
the University of Chicago Law School in 1929-1930. Out of a total of eighty
reports secured from manufacturers and dealers, twenty-two cases were found
in which no express warranties were made to consumers. In no case was it re-
ported that any implied warranties arising out of the Uniform Sales Act were
expressly given by the seller. In only nine cases was any warranty actually
made directly to the consumer, ignoring the dealer or retailer. Bogert and Fink,
Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 11. L. Rev.
400 (1930).
22 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
23 Id. at 390, 234 N.W. at 519.
24 Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (8th Cir. 1919). See Binion v. Sasaki,
80 Cal. App. 910, 41 P.2d 585, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 621 (1935).
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an illegal contract.25 A situation analogous to that faced by
survivors of a sub-purchaser who dies because of some defect
in a chattel is presented in cases where a person is injured by
a defective chattel received in the course of his occupation. For
example, it has been held that where a waitress in a lunch
room received a piece of cake from her employer as part of
her lunch and was injured by a nail baked into the cake, re-
covery could not be had against the bakery supplying the cake,
since any implied warranties respecting the bakery's product
extended only to the employer and not the employee.2
The complicated development of the law of sales concerning
implied warranties appears to have left the courts in some con-
fusion as to whether or not the action of the person injured is
actually in contract or really sounds in tort.27 It has, in fact,
been suggested that the action for breach of warranty is not
within the conventions of either tort or contract actions but is
essentially sui generis.28 A clear analogy may be developed be-
tween cases of this type proceeding on the tort theory and those
proceeding on the contract theory. The general rule in tort ac-
tions established by the early American and English cases was
that where a defective chattel was soldby a middleman to a
sub-purchaser, the original negligence of the manufacturer was
"insulated" by the resale and the purchaser's only remedy was
against the immediate vendee, who in turn had recourse
against the manufacturer. Precisely as in the case of actions
on warranties, a series of exceptions developed to mitigate the
harshness of this general rule2 0 Where the chattel was of a
type which the courts found "imminently dangerous," recovery
was allowed directly against the manufacturer.2 ' This was
particularly true of food, 2 beverages,3 and drugs.34 Never-
25 Boliver v. Monnat, 130 Misc. 660, 224 N.Y. Supp. 535 (1927).
26 Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923). Contra,
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
27 Waite, Sales 192-197 (2d ed. 1938); Prosser, Torts §§82, 83 (1941).
28 Waite, supra note 27, at 196.
29 Prosser, supra note 27, §83.
30 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009
(1915); Prosser, supra note 27, §83; Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Per-
sons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. Rev. 343 (1929).
31 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
32 Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 43, 144 Atl. 884 (1929);
Ketterer v. Armour, 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Drury v. Armour & Co.,
140 Ark. 371, 216 S.W. 40 (1919); Prosser, Torts §83 (1941).
33 Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80 (1915);
Freezer, aupra note 8, at 18; Russell, Manufacturers Liability to the Ultimate
Consumer, 21 Ky. L... 388, 389 (1933); Note, 17 A.L.R. 672, 696 (1922).
34 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
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theless, the majority of cases continued to be covered by the
old rule, despite the efforts of legal commentators to obtain a
more liberal line of decisions. 5 In 1916, the situation came
before Justice Cardozo in the famous case of McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,30 which in effect rejected the old rule and
gave the consumer a direct remedy against the manufacturer
of the defective chattel (in this case an automobile with a
faulty wheel) though the original purchase had been through
a middleman. 3 7 Thereafter, what Cardozo termed ". . . subtle
distinction ... between things inherently dangerous and things
imminently dangerous" were not to determine whether the
purchaser had or had not a direct remedy against the manu-
facturer. 3s The fundamental philosophy of the decision was
clearly that the manufacturer ". . . by placing the car upon
the market, assumed a responsibility to the consumer, resting
not upon the contract but upon the relation arising from his
purchase and the foreseeability of harm if proper care were not
used." 30 While a few courts have adopted this point of view
only after much delay,40 it may safely be said that the Mc-
Pherson case represents the law on the subject of tort lia-
bility.
4'
It might be added' as a brief digression that in food and
drink cases there has been a strong tendency to apply the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, thus emphasizing once again the
strong appeal made by a rule of strict liability.42 Professor
Waite comments that this trend has been so strong as to make
this remedy practically equivalent to a suit based on war-
ranty.43 Thus, the res ipsa loquitur theory has been applied to
cases in which such varied items as gauze bandages, 44 pieces
35 Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in The Law of Torts, 53
U.Pa.L. Rev. 209, 273, 337 (1905), may be referred to as an early example., See
also Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372,
376, 39 Col. L. Rev. 20, 24, 48 Yale L.J. 390, 394 (1939).
386217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
37 This decision, at least, appeared to meet the approval of the layman. See
Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis, 33 Col. L. Rev. 199, 205 (1933).
38 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916).
39 Prosser, Torts §83 (1941).
40 The Massachusetts court, long more conservative in this regard than other
tribunals, has only recently adopted the rule of. the McPherson case. Carter v.
Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
41 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); Restatement,
Torts §§394-402 (1934); Feezer, Manufacturers Liability for Injuries Caused
by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1938).
42 Prosser, Torts §83 (1941).
43 Waite, Sales 203 (2d ed. 1938).
44 Beaumont Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Guillot, 222 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1949).
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of glass,4 5 and the skeleton of a mouse 46 were found in bever-
ages. The manufacture of perfume which irritated the skin, 7
and bread containing foreign substances 48 have also been held
sufficient to authorize application of the doctrine.4" While some
courts have been reluctant to allow recovery on the res ipsa
loquitur theory in situations of this type,50 it seems clear that
an increasing readiness on the part of many t-ibunals to hold
manufacturers strictly liable in tort actions is discernible.
It is submitted that this trend in tort cases might well be
followed by courts in their consideration of related problems
where the suit is for breach of warranty. Whether the action
sounds in tort or contract is'not, after all, a matter of funda-
mental importance. What is important is that consumers have
a clear, direct remedy against manufacturers of defective
goods without being hampered by technical rules of law which
appear to have outlived their usefulness. Certainly the techni-
cal nature of the rule demanding privity of contract in suits
based on warranty - as opposed to similar suits based on
warranty - is well illustrated by the fact that in at least two
situations where the ordinary rule has been that no sale exists,
recovery has been allowed for breach of warranty. In the case
of bailments for hire, clearly not a sale transaction, the ordi-
nary rule is that an implied warranty of reasonable safety and
suitability for the intended use will be found. 1 The rule in
respect to restaurants - based on early English precedent
45 Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl.
700 (1929).
46 Eisenbiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 163 (1933).
47 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
48 Bissonette v. National Biscuit Co., 100 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1939).
49 In Robinson v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y.S.2d 42
(1946), a customer in a self-service store was allowed to recover on the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine for injuries received when she was struck on the head by
a can which fell from the shelf. Cf. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng.
Repr. 299 (1863); Kearney v. London, B. & S.C. Ry. Co., L.R. 5, Q.B. 411 (1870).
Yet in the Robinson decision, supra, and in Pollat v. Wray, 141 Neb. 9, 2 N.W.2d
352 (1942), the fact was recognized that under the self-service plan of grocery
store operation, customers are expected to move about the store, to freely handle
merchandise and to remove and replace the goods 6n the shelves. How does this
result square with the idea that to apply the res .ipsa loquitur doctrine, the
injurious instrumentality must be under the exclusive control of the defendant?
50 See Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N.E.2d 259 (1942);
Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 222 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1949).
51 Gambino v. John Lucas & Co., 263 App. Div. 1054, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1942);
Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923); General
Talking Pictures Co. v. Shea, 187 Ark. 568, 61 S.W.2d 430 (1933). Contra,
Copeland v. Draper, 157 Mass. 558, 32 N.E. 944 (1893).
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is that a customer does not purchase food but service,. 2 yet the
clear trend of judicial authority appears to be that recovery
will be allowed on the warranty theory whether the transaction
is held to be a sale or not.53
Despite the arguments advanced against the rule of strict
liability,54 it seems clear that the rule of privity is on its way
toward rejection in warranty cases. The most authoritative
single example is provided by the American Law Institute,
which has. included a provision directly covering the subject
in the latest draft of the Uniform Commercial Code: "A war-
ranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is his
guest or one whose relationship to him is such as to make it
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty . . ." 55 The comment following this section
states that this provision is intended to broaden the right of
the consumers in warranty and ". . . to free them from any
technical rules as to 'privity' and to make them, insofar as
feasible, directly enforceable against the party ultimately re-
sponsible for the injury." 56 Beyond this, the basic test set up
by the Uniform Code is whether the ". . . person injured was
in such a relationship to the buyer as could reasonably be ex-
pected to result in his use, handling or consumption of the
goods in ordinary course, or was the type of relationship which
could reasonably be expected to result in his being affected by
the breach of warranty." 57 The Uniform Code also makes pro-
vision for the retailer who is sued by an injured consumer by
providing that the retailer may interplead the manufacturer. s
52 Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533 (1914); Prinsen v. Russos,
194 Wis. 142,- 215 N.W. 905 (1927); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F.2d
439 (1934); Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atli 343 (1925); Nisky v.
Childs, 103 N.J. Law 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927); Bigelow v. Maine C. Ry., 110
Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912).
58Amdal v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 84 F.Supp. 657 (N.D. Iowa 1949), 26 N.D.
Bar Briefs 59 (1950); Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (App. D.C. 1936);
Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Co., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Harman v. S. H.
Kress & Co.; 78 F.Supp. 952 (S.D. Texas 1948); Vold, Sales §§ 152, 153 (1931);
Tentative Draft, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (1), comment 5 (May, 1949).
54 Notably by Mr. Peairs in his article referred to in footnote 6.
55 Tentative Draft, Uniform Commercial Cpde § 2-318 (May, 1949).
58 Id. §2-318, comment 1.
57 d. §2-318, comment 2.
58 Id. §2-718. This provision, together with the sections cited above, also solve
the problem faced by the consumer who is forced to sue a middleman and then
cannot collect because of insolvency.
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The right of the consumer injured by breach of warranty to
sue the retailer directly is also recognized.
59
The result of these provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, if adopted, would undoubtedly be of fundamental im-
portance in the law of sales. The practical effect is to incor-
porate the foreseeability test of tort actions envisaged by the
McPherson case into the law of warranty as a basis for deter-
mining whether a manufacturer shall be held strictly liable to
the consumer injured because of a defective chattel. The pro-
cedure outlined by the Uniform Commercial Code therefore
appears highly desirable, providing the clear, direct remedy
against manufacturers which has been lacking under the Uni-
form Sales Act because of the privity requirement.
An examination of the law in North Dakota, while clearly
disclosing the present rule to be that privity of contract is a
necessity to a suit on an implied warranty,6 0 nevertheless indi-
cates some disposition on the part of the courts to give pur-
chasers a direct remedy for breach of warranty despite efforts
of the vendors to contract againstsuch liability. Thus, in Smith
v. Oscar M. Wills & Co.,q' it was held that a complete disclaimer
of warranty in a contract for the sale of alfalfa was not suffi-
cient to bar recovery by the vendee when the seed turned out to
be sweet clover, the court stating that despite the disclaimer of
warranty the vendee could recover for "breach of contract." In
Ward v. Valker O2 a similar warranty disclaimer was held in-
effective to bar recovery by the vendee. 63 The subsequently de-
cided case of Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking s,
held, however, that such a disclaimer of warranty would be
given effect by the court in the sale of farm machinery where
the plaintiff had not rescinded within a reasonable time as per-
mitted by North Dakota law.6 5 Despite this decision, it seems
* 59 Id. §2-719.
60 Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
61 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924).
62 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920).
63 However, see 151-0172, N.D. Rev. Code (1943): "Where any right, duty,
or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law,
it may b negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing
between the parties, or by custom, if the custom is such as to bind both parties
to the contract or the sale."
64 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926).
65 N. D. Rev. Code 1 51-0707 (1943), provides that in the case of sales of
certain types of farm machinery, the purchaser shall have a reasonable time
after delivery in which to rescind the sale if the machinery fails to be reason-
ably fit for the-purpose for which it was purchased, any provision to the contrary
in the contract of sale being void as against public policy.
COMMENT
clear that Smith v. Oscar H. Wills & Co., supra, and Ward v.
Valker, supra, show a disposition on the part of the North Da-
kota court to adopt liberal, non-technical rules with respect to
warranties wherever possible. As has been previously pointed
out in the North Dakota Bar Briefs 6 this is partly because of
the recognized public policy in this state of protecting agricul-
tural interests. The logical next step would be a decision over-
ruling or modifying the rule of Wood v. Advance Rumely
Thresher Co., supra, - a decision out of harmony with this
policy - thus incidentally giving North Dakota consumers a
clear-cut remedy against manufacturers of defective goods.
CHARLES LIEBERT CRUM
Third Year Law Student.
STERILIZATION - SCOPE OF THE STATE'S POWER TO USE
STERILIZATION ON MENTAL DEFECTIVES AND CRIMINALS
OPERATION OF NORTH DAKOTA STATUTE
F EW TOPICS have caused more vigorous debate among mem-
bers-of the legal profession than the operation and effect of
statutes providing for the use of sterilization upon mentally
defective human beings and upon habitual criminals. Touch-
ing, as they do, a fundamental part of human existence, the
statutes have been bitterly assailed and vigorously defended
by partisans on both sides of the controversy. Despite the
attack leveled against them, the use of sterilization procedures
has increased rapidly since the first statutes were enacted.
Today, sterilization has become one of society's major weapons
in the fight to preserve a healthy and intelligent human race.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STERILIZATION STATUTES
State statutes concerned with sterilization have been in
force since the beginning of the 20th century.1 The legality of
6o Nordine, Sales - Warranties - Disclaimers - Effectiveness as to Variety
in a Sale of Seeds by Description, 24 N.D. Bar Briefs 151 (1948).
1 The date of enactment of first statute is in parenthesis following the name
of the state:
Alabama (1919), statute declared unconstitutional, In re Opinion of Justices,
230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Arizona (1929) Ariz. Code §1 8-401, 8-406
(1939); California (1909), Cal. Code § 6624 (Deering 1937), Cal. Code 9 2670
(Deering Supp. 1941); Connecticut (1909), Conn. Rev. Stat. c. 209 (1918);
Delaware (1923), Del. Rev. Code § 3098 (1935); Georgia. (1937); Idaho (1925),
Idaho Code H4 64-601 to 64-612 (1932); Indiana (1907), Burns Stat. 41 22-1601
to 22-1618 (1933); Iowa (1911), Iowa Code §§ 145.1 to 145.22 (1946); Kansas
(1913), Kan. Stat. H4 76-149 to 76-155 (1935); Maine (1925), Me. Rev Stat.
